1 2 3 4 5	Laura E. Duffy United States Attorney Alessandra P. Serano Assistant U.S. Attorney Cal. State Bar No. 204796 Office of the U.S. Attorney 880 Front Street, Room 6293 San Diego, CA 92101-8893 Telephone: (619) 546-8104 Alessandra.p.serano@usdoj.gov	
6	Attorneys for the United States of America	
7 8	IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA	
9	UNITED STATES OF AMERICA) Case No.: 13CR3921-BEN
10	Plaintiff,) Date: December 16, 2013
11	VS.	Time: 2:00 p.m.
12	MICHAEL LUSTIG,	GOVERNMENT'S RESPONSE AND
13	Defendant.	OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO:
14		(1) Compel Discovery/Preserve
15		{ Evidence
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18	COMES NOW, the plaintiff, UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, by and	
19	through its counsel Laura E. Duffy, United States Attorney, and Alessandra P	
20	Serano, Assistant U.S. Attorney, and hereby files its Response and Opposition to	
21	the motions filed on behalf of defendant which is based upon the files and record	
22	of this case.	
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POINTS AND AUTHORITIES

A. The Motion to Compel Discovery Should Be Denied

The Government intends to fully comply with its discovery obligations under <u>Brady v. Maryland</u>, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), the Jencks Act (18 U.S.C. § 3500), and Rule 16 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. The Government anticipates that most discovery issues can be resolved amicably and informally, and has addressed Defendant's specific requests below.

(1) The Defendant's Statements

The Government recognizes its obligation under Rules 16(a)(1)(A) and 16(a)(1)(B) to provide to Defendant the substance of Defendant's oral statements and Defendant's written statements. The Government has produced all of Defendant's written statements that are known to the undersigned Assistant U.S. Attorney at this date. If the Government discovers additional oral or written statements that require disclosure under Rule 16(a)(1)(A) or Rule 16(a)(1)(B), such statements will be provided to Defendant.

The Government has no objection to the preservation of the handwritten notes taken by any of the Government's agents and officers. See United States v. Harris, 543 F.2d 1247, 1253 (9th Cir. 1976) (agents must preserve their original notes of interviews of an accused or prospective government witnesses). However, the Government objects to providing Defendant with a copy of any rough notes at this time. Rule 16(a)(1)(A) does not require disclosure of the rough notes where the content of those notes have been accurately reflected in a type-written report. See United States v. Brown, 303 F.3d 582, 590 (5th Cir. 2002); United States v. Coe, 220 F.3d 573, 583 (7th Cir. 2000) (Rule 16(a)(1)(A) does not require disclosure of an agent's notes even where there are "minor discrepancies" between the notes and a report). The Government is not required to produce rough notes pursuant to the Jencks Act, because the notes do not constitute "statements" (as

defined 18 U.S.C. § 3500(e)) unless the notes (1) comprise both a substantially 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14

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verbatim narrative of a witness' assertion, and (2) have been approved or adopted by the witness. United States v. Spencer, 618 F.2d 605, 606-07 (9th Cir. 1980). The rough notes in this case do not constitute "statements" in accordance with the Jencks Act. See United States v. Ramirez, 954 F.2d 1035, 1038-39 (5th Cir. 1992) (rough notes were not statements under the Jencks Act where notes were scattered and all the information contained in the notes was available in other forms). The notes are not Brady material because the notes do not present any material exculpatory information, or any evidence favorable to Defendant that is material to guilt or punishment. Brown, 303 F.3d at 595-96 (rough notes were not Brady material because the notes were neither favorable to the defense nor material to defendant's guilt or punishment); United States v. Ramos, 27 F.3d 65, 71 (3d Cir. 1994) (mere speculation that agents' rough notes contained Brady evidence was insufficient). If, during a future evidentiary hearing, certain rough notes become discoverable under Rule 16, the Jencks Act, or Brady, the notes in question will be provided to Defendant.

The Government opposes producing copies of any telephone calls while he has been in custody unless the Government has them in its possession. Defendant is free to order copies of his jail calls on his own.

(2) Arrest Reports, Notes or Dispatch Tapes

The United States has provided the Defendant with arrest reports. As noted previously, agent rough notes, if any exist, will be preserved, but they will not be produced as part of Rule 16 discovery. There are no dispatch tapes.

(3,9) Brady/Henthron

The United States is well aware of and will continue to perform its duty under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), and United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97 (1976), to disclose exculpatory evidence within its possession that is material to the issue of guilt or punishment. Defendant, however, is not entitled to

all evidence known or believed to exist which is, or may be, favorable to the accused, or which pertains to the credibility of the United States' case. As stated in <u>United States v. Gardner</u>, 611 F.2d 770 (9th Cir. 1980), it must be noted that "the prosecution does not have a constitutional duty to disclose every bit of information that might affect the jury's decision; it need only disclose information favorable to the defense that meets the appropriate standard of materiality." <u>Id.</u> at 774-775 (citation omitted).

The United States will turn over evidence within its possession which could be used to properly impeach a witness who has been called to testify.

Although the United States will provide conviction records, if any, which could be used to impeach a witness, the United States is under no obligation to turn over the criminal records of all witnesses. <u>United States v. Taylor</u>, 542 F.2d 1023, 1026 (8th Cir. 1976). When disclosing such information, disclosure need only extend to witnesses the United States intends to call in its case-in-chief. <u>United States v. Gering</u>, 716 F.2d 615, 621 (9th Cir. 1983); <u>United States v. Angelini</u>, 607 F.2d 1305, 1309 (9th Cir. 1979).

Finally, the United States will continue to comply with its obligations pursuant to United States v. Henthorn, 931 F.2d 29 (9th Cir. 1991).

(4) <u>Sentencing Information</u>

Defendant claims that the United States must disclose any information affecting Defendant's sentencing guidelines because such information is discoverable under <u>Brady v. Maryland</u>, 373 U.S. 83 (1963). The United States respectfully contends that it has no such disclosure obligation under <u>Brady</u>.

The United States is not obligated under Brady to furnish a defendant with information which he already knows. <u>United States v. Taylor</u>, 802 F.2d 1108, 1118 n.5 (9th Cir. 1986). <u>Brady</u> is a rule of disclosure, and therefore, there can be no violation of <u>Brady</u> if the evidence is already known to the defendant. In such

case, the United States has not suppressed the evidence and consequently has no <u>Brady</u> obligation. See <u>United States v. Gaggi</u>, 811 F.2d 47, 59 (2nd Cir. 1987).

But even assuming Defendant does not already possess the information about factors which might affect his guideline range, the United States would not be required to provide information bearing on Defendant's mitigation of punishment until after Defendant's conviction or plea of guilty and prior to his sentencing date. See <u>United States v. Juvenile Male</u>, 864 F.2d 641, 647 (9th Cir. 1988) ("No [Brady] violation occurs if the evidence is disclosed to the defendant at a time when the disclosure remains in value."). Accordingly, Defendant's demand for this information is premature.

(5) Defendant's Prior Record

The United States has already provided Defendant with a copy of the criminal record in accordance with Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 16(a)(1)(B).

(6) Proposed 404(b) Evidence

Should the United States seek to introduce any similar act evidence pursuant to Federal Rules of Evidence 404(b), the United States will provide Defendant with notice of its proposed use of such evidence and information about such other acts at the time the United States' trial memorandum is filed.

(7-8) Evidence Seized/Preservation of Evidence

The United States has complied and will continue to comply with Rule 16(a)(1)(c) in allowing Defendant an opportunity, upon reasonable notice, to examine, copy and inspect physical evidence which is within the possession, custody or control of the United States, and which is material to the preparation of Defendant's defense or are intended for use by the United States as evidence in chief at trial, or were obtained from or belong to Defendant, including photographs.

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The United States, however, need not produce rebuttal evidence in advance of trial. <u>United States v. Givens</u>, 767 F.2d 574, 584 (9th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 953 (1985). The United States does not object to an order preserving evidence so long as it has an expiration date agreeable to both parties.

(10) **Documents and Tangible Objects**

The Government has complied and will continue to comply with Rule 16(a)(1)(E) in allowing Defendant an opportunity, upon reasonable notice, to examine, inspect, and copy all tangible objects seized that is within its possession, custody, or control, and that is either material to the preparation of Defendant's defense, or is intended for use by the Government as evidence during its case-inchief at trial, or was obtained from or belongs to Defendant. The Government need not, however, produce rebuttal evidence in advance of trial. <u>United States v. Givens</u>, 767 F.2d 574, 584 (9th Cir. 1984).

(11, 27) <u>Scientific Tests/Experts</u>

The Government will comply with Rule 16(a)(1)(G) and provide Defendant with a written summary of any expert testimony that the Government intends to use under Rules 702, 703, or 705 of the Federal Rules of Evidence during its case-in-chief at trial. This summary shall include the expert witnesses' qualifications, the expert witnesses' opinions, the bases, and reasons for those opinions.

(12) Impeachment Evidence

As stated previously, the United States will turn over evidence within its possession which could be used to properly impeach a witness who has been called to testify.

(13) <u>Criminal Investigation of Government Witness</u>

Defendant is not entitled to any evidence that a prospective witness is under criminal investigation by federal, state, or local authorities. "[T]he criminal records of such [Government] witnesses are not discoverable." <u>United States v. Taylor</u>, 542 F.2d 1023, 1026 (8th Cir. 1976); <u>United States v. Riley</u>, 657 F.2d

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1377, 1389 (8th Cir. 1981) (holding that since criminal records of prosecution witnesses are not discoverable under Rule 16, rap sheets are not either); cf. <u>United States v. Rinn</u>, 586 F.2d 113, 118-19 (9th Cir. 1978) (noting in dicta that "[i]t has been said that the Government has no discovery obligation under Fed. R. Crim. P. 16(a)(1)(c) to supply a defendant with the criminal records of the Government's intended witnesses.") (citing <u>Taylor</u>, 542 F.2d at 1026).

The Government will, however, provide the conviction record, if any, which could be used to impeach witnesses the Government intends to call in its case-in-chief. When disclosing such information, disclosure need only extend to witnesses the United States intends to call in its case-in-chief. <u>United States v. Gering</u>, 716 F.2d 615, 621 (9th Cir. 1983); <u>United States v. Angelini</u>, 607 F.2d 1305, 1309 (9th Cir. 1979).

(14) Evidence of Bias or Motive to Lie

The United States is unaware of any evidence indicating that a prospective witness is biased or prejudiced against Defendant. The United States is also unaware of any evidence that prospective witnesses have a motive to falsify or distort testimony.

(15) Evidence Affecting Perception, Recollection, Communication or Truth-Telling

The United States is unaware of any evidence indicating that a prospective witness has a problem with perception, recollection, communication, or truth-telling.

(16) Witness Addresses

The Government has already provided Defendant with the reports containing the names of the agents involved in the apprehension and interviews of Defendant. A defendant in a non-capital case, however, has no right to discover the identity of prospective Government witnesses prior to trial. See <u>Weatherford v. Bursey</u>, 429 U.S. 545, 559 (1977); <u>United States v. Dishner</u>, 974 F.2d 1502, 1522 (9th Cir.

1992) (citing <u>United States v. Steel</u>, 759 F.2d 706, 709 (9th Cir. 1985)); <u>United States v. Hicks</u>, 103 F.23d 837, 841 (9th Cir. 1996). Nevertheless, in its trial memorandum, the Government will provide Defendant with a list of all witnesses whom it intends to call in its case-in-chief, although delivery of such a witness list is not required. See <u>United States v. Discher</u>, 960 F.2d 870 (9th Cir. 1992); <u>United States v. Mills</u>, 810 F.2d 907, 910 (9th Cir. 1987). The Government is not aware of any "tips" provided by anonymous or identified persons that resulted in Defendant's arrest.

The Government objects to Defendant's request that the Government provide a list of every witness to the crimes charged who will not be called as a Government witness. "There is no statutory basis for granting such broad requests," and a request for the names and addresses of witnesses who will not be called at trial "far exceed[s] the parameters of Rule 16(a)(1)8." <u>United States v. Hsin-Yung</u>, 97 F. Supp.2d 24, 36 (D. D.C. 2000) (quoting <u>United States v. Boffa</u>, 513 F. Supp. 444, 502 (D. Del. 1980)). The Government is not required to produce all possible information and evidence regarding any speculative defense claimed by Defendant. <u>Wood v. Bartholomew</u>, 516 U.S. 1, 6-8 (1995) (per curiam) (holding that inadmissible materials that are not likely to lead to the discovery of admissible exculpatory evidence are not subject to disclosure under <u>Brady</u>).

(17) Witnesses Favorable to the Defendant

As stated earlier, the Government will continue to comply with its obligations under <u>Brady</u> and its progeny. Other than the material witnesses in this case, the Government is not aware of any witnesses who have made an "arguably favorable statement concerning the defendant or who could not identify him or who w[ere] unsure of his identity, or participation in the crime charged."

(18) <u>Statements Relevant to the Defense</u>

To reiterate, the United States will comply with all of its discovery obligations. However, "the prosecution does not have a constitutional duty to

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disclose every bit of information that might affect the jury's decision; it need only disclose information favorable to the defense that meets the appropriate standard of materiality." <u>Gardner</u>, 611 F.2d at 774-775 (citation omitted). Further, Defendant is not entitled to the Grand Jury transcripts.

(19) Jencks Act Material

The Jencks Act, 18 U.S.C. §3500, requires that, after a Government witness has testified on direct examination, the Government must give the Defendant any "statement" (as defined by the Jencks Act) in the Government's possession that was made by the witness relating to the subject matter to which the witness testified. 18 U.S.C. § 3500(b). A "statement" under the Jencks Act is (1) a written statement made by the witness and signed or otherwise adopted or approved by him, (2) a substantially verbatim, contemporaneously recorded transcription of the witness's oral statement, or (3) a statement by the witness before a grand jury. 18 If notes are read back to a witness to see whether or not the U.S.C. § 3500(e). government agent correctly understood what the witness was saying, that act constitutes "adoption by the witness" for purposes of the Jencks Act. United States v. Boshell, 952 F.2d 1101, 1105 (9th Cir. 1991) (citing Goldberg v. United States, 425 U.S. 94, 98 (1976)). While the Government is only required to produce all Jencks Act material after the witness testifies, the Government plans to provide most (if not all) Jencks Act material well in advance of trial to avoid any needless delays.

(20, 23) <u>Giglio Information</u>

As stated previously, the United States will comply with its obligations pursuant to <u>Brady v. Maryland</u>, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), the Jencks Act, <u>United States v. Henthorn</u>, 931 F.2d 29 (9th Cir. 1991), and <u>Giglio v. United States</u>, 405 U.S. 150 (1972).

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(21) Agreements Between the Government and Witnesses

The Government has not made or attempted to make any agreements with prospective Government witnesses for any type of compensation for their cooperation or testimony.

(22) <u>Informants and Cooperating Witnesses</u>

The Government must generally disclose the identity of informants where (1) the informant is a material witness, or (2) the informant's testimony is crucial to the defense. Roviaro v. United States, 353 U.S. 53, 59 (1957). If there is a confidential informant involved in this case, the Court may, in some circumstances, be required to conduct an in-chambers inspection to determine whether disclosure of the informant's identity is required under Roviaro. See United States v. Ramirez-Rangel, 103 F.3d 1501, 1508 (9th Cir. 1997). If the Government determines that there is a confidential informant who is a material witness in this case, the Government will either disclose the identity of the informant or submit the informant's identity to the Court for an in-chambers inspection.

(28) Residual Request

The Government has already complied with Defendant's request for prompt compliance with its discovery obligations. The Government will comply with all of its discovery obligations, but objects to the broad and unspecified nature of Defendant's residual discovery request.

Specific Requests

Defendant has requested specific items, each is addressed below.

1. <u>Audio recordings from hotel</u> – The United States has produced all recordings requested. Undersigned reviewed pages 8-9 of discovery and does not see where Defendant believes there is video. There is no video from the hotel relating to the June 2012 incident.

- 2. Evidence from Seized Telephones The United States produced all of the downloads from the four phones that were seized from him in June 2012. Moreover, the United States previously produced a copy of all of the photographed text messages from the purple Kyocera phone.
- 3. <u>Yahoo documents</u> The documents seized via search warrant were from an email account purportedly belonging to Defendant. Defendant has access to his own email and can obtain a copy of his emails on his own. The United States will produce any documents from this search warrant it intends to use at trial in advance of trial.
- Cox Communications documents Defendant request documents from the subpoena served to Cox Communications. Pages 17-20 (some of the pages he identifies) are the documents received from Cox.
- Recorded Interview Defendant invoked his right to counsel so there is no interview. The report documents the recording by the Sheriff's Office to attempt to interview Defendant. (see page 57 of discovery)
- 6. <u>Giglio information on the minors</u> the United States is well aware of its discovery obligations and will make all appropriate disclosures. Because of their minor status, much of the information will require a protective order to avoid unnecessary disclosure.
- 7. <u>Video still with MF1's initials</u> the video still images was produced in discovery, page 12.
- 8. <u>Color copies of line-ups</u> the United States previously produced an electronic color copy of the six-pack line-ups on a CD.

DATED: December 3, 2013 Respectfully submitted,

LAURA E. DUFFY United States Attorney

s/Alessandra P. Serano ALESSANDRA P. SERANO Assistant United States Attorney

1 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 2 3 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 4 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Case No. 13CR3921-BEN 5 Plaintiff, 6 7 v. CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 8 Michael Lustig, 9 Defendant. 10 11 12 IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED THAT: 13 I, ALESSANDRA P. SERANO, am a citizen of the United States and am at 14 least eighteen years of age. My business address is 880 Front Street, Room 6293, 15 San Diego, California 92101-8893. 16 I am not a party to the above-entitled action. I have caused service of United 17 States' Response and Opposition to Defendant's Motions by electronically filing 18 the foregoing with the Clerk of the District Court using its ECF System, which 19 electronically notifies them. 20 I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct. 21 Executed on December 3, 2013 22 23 s/Alessandra P. Serano 24 ALESSANDRA P. SERANO 25 26 27 28